

Stable Polarization Entanglement based Quantum Key Distribution over a deployed Metropolitan Fiber

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We demonstrate a quantum key distribution implementation over deployed dark telecom fibers with polarisation-entangled photons generated at the O-band. One of the photons in the pairs are propagated through 10 km of deployed fiber while the others are detected locally. Polarisation drifts experienced by the photons propagating through the fibers are compensated with liquid crystal variable retarders. This ensures continuous and stable QKD operation with an average QBER of 6.4% and a final key rate of 109 bits/s.

I. INTRODUCTION

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables two users to share a common encryption key that is secret to any third parties. Early QKD protocols such as BB84¹ were "prepare-and-measure" schemes, with practical derivatives such as SARG04² and decoy states³. This was complemented by the invention of entanglement-based protocols such as E91⁴ and BBM92⁵, with quantitative extensions through device-independent QKD⁶. Both types of QKD protocols have been proven theoretically secure and have been studied extensively over the decades^{7–10}.

For prepare-and-measure protocols, a trusted random number generator is required to provide randomness in the state preparation process. This is not required for entanglement-based QKD protocols, where randomness of the key originates from the measurement process itself. Entanglement-based QKD also does not rely on a true single photon source or a decoy state mechanism to mitigate a photon number splitting attack, and has fewer possible side channels than typical prepare-send scenarios. As such, entanglement based QKD is less vulnerable to attacks in practical implementations¹¹.

Both freespace and optical fibre links have been used as the transmission channel for distributing entangled photon pairs¹². Due to low optical attenuation in the atmosphere, the channel loss over freespace links can be as low as 0.07 dB/km at high altitudes¹³. For protocols using polarisation entanglement, the state of the photons is well preserved during freespace transmission. Early implementations of freespace QKD used optical telescopes to send and receive photons over a range^{14–16}, reaching over hundred of kilometers¹³. Further more, this range can be extended to thousands of kilometers by utilizing satellites as intermediate nodes¹⁷.

Optical fiber links, on the other hand, are suitable when a line-of-sight is not available. Fiber-based QKD generally operates over shorter range (<100 km) due to

optical attenuation of light in the fiber. This is, however, enough to cover metropolitan areas where a fiber network is available^{18–21}.

The available telecom single mode fiber conforms to the ITU G.652 standard²². To maximize range, fiber-based QKD systems can use entangled photons generated at telecom C-band (1530-1565 nm) where fiber absorption is at its minimum (0.2 dB/km)^{21, 23–25}. The O-band in (1260-1360 nm) is another choice of wavelength, with an absorption loss of about 0.32 dB/km. The total loss over fiber transmission in a realistic link is always higher due to the presence of splicing and patching points.

The presence of dispersion effects is another possible limiting factor to the performance of entanglement-based QKD over fiber. Entangled photon pairs are usually generated via a Spontaneous Parametric Down Conversion (SPDC) process, which leads to photons of relatively large bandwidth when performed in nonlinear optical crystals, compared to photons generated with lasers. Such wideband photons experience then significant chromatic dispersion in the fiber (~ 18 ps/nm/km at 1550 nm)²⁶. This increases the uncertainty in timing correlation between the entangled photons, leading to a lower signal to noise ratio, eventually reducing the final key rate. The effect of chromatic dispersion can be mitigated by using dispersion-shifted fiber²³, or by using entangled photons at telecom O-band operating on either side of the zero-dispersion wavelength of the fiber²⁷.

For QKD protocols using polarisation encoding, an optical fibre cannot be simply regarded as a pure loss channel. When propagating through the fibre, an arbitrary rotation is applied to the polarization state of photons and causes basis mismatch. In addition, fiber Polarisation Mode Dispersion (PMD) can cause degradation of polarisation entanglement for broadband photons^{28–30}. Both effects increase the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER), reducing the rate of key generation. While the polarisation rotation can be compensated³¹, the presence of polarisation mode dispersion has led to a preference of time-bin encoding over polarisation encoding in fiber-based QKD implementations^{29, 32, 33}. However in recent years, manufacturers are able to make single mode telecom fibers with much lower PMD value (≤ 0.04 ps/ $\sqrt{\text{km}}$)^{26, 34}, which

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


FIG. 3. (a) Optical time-domain reflectometer trace of the deployed fibre, identifying a high reflection loss point about 5 km away from both end points. Two more points with high reflection/absorption loss are also identified about 100 meters from the end points, which is due to a 100 meter patching cable between the deployed fiber and the laboratory setup. (b) **Long-term polarization stability of the fiber is characterized by sending polarized laser light across the fiber and measuring the stokes parameters of the output state. With the underground deployed fiber, the polarization state drifts slowly on a time scale of days.**

Bob's setup is connected locally via a short patchcord carrying the idler photons.

The 10 km telecom fiber is deployed underground by Singapore Telecommunications Limited in a loop configuration with both ends located at Center for Quantum Technologies, National University of Singapore. Measurement using an optical time-domain reflectometer (OTDR) shows a total fiber length of 10.4 km with about -7 dB channel loss (Fig. 3). The optical absorption of the fiber contributes only about -4 dB to the total channel loss, with another -3 dB loss due to reflections at patching points and losses at splicing points. **The total PMD of the fiber link is about 0.1 ps measured with a commercial analyzer, which is smaller than the coherence time of the signal and idler photons (~ 0.23 ps for 25 nm bandwidth at 1310 nm).**

Polarization change due to fiber is compensated by placing a set of 4 LCVRs before Bob's analyzer to enable an arbitrary rotation of the polarization state. This compensation only needs to be applied to one of the photons from each pair to restore the initial $|\Phi^+\rangle$ state after fiber propagation³⁶. In some implementations with optical fibers on the surface³¹, polarisation compensation needs to be constantly performed due to the rapid change of the polarization change, which severely limits the operation continuity of QKD.

The polarization stability of 10 km deployed fibre in our

setup was characterized by sending in light with well-defined polarization state across the fiber and monitoring the change in polarization with a polarimeter³⁷. We find that the output polarization drift was slow, with a typical 24 h period associated with day-night temperature change. Once the polarization rotation is compensated, the fiber allows several hours of stable QKD operation even without running any active compensation scheme.

Upon receiving the photons, Alice and Bob follow the BBM92 protocol by measuring polarizations in one of the two bases: H/V and D/A⁵. The random detection basis choice is made by a non-polarizing beam splitter in each setup which transmits and reflects photons with equal probability³⁸. Four commercial Indium Gallium Arsenide Avalanche Photodiodes (InGaAs APDs) are used in each analyzer setup for single photon detection. The APDs diodes are cooled down to below -40°C and are operated in freerunning mode with a nominal detection efficiency around 10% and an average dark count rate of about 12000 s^{-1} . On each side, detected photons are timetagged to a resolution of 125 ps with a 4-channel timestamping device locked to a rubidium frequency standard³⁹.

Recorded timestamp traces are continuously exchanged through a network connection between two hosting lab computers. To enable coincidence identification, the clocks on both sides are synchronized in advance by exploiting the intrinsic timing correlations of the SPDC photons⁴⁰. The uncertainty in the coincidence time difference is about 1.9 ns (FWHM) due to fiber chromatic dispersion, detector timing jitter and other noise in the system²⁷. For coincidence identification, a coincidence window of 0.5 ns was chosen to optimize the coincidence/accidental ratio without losing too many coincidence events.

Raw key data are generated after coincidence identification and key sifting following a typical BBM92 protocol. Error correction are then performed on each block of raw key data accumulated over 25 seconds³⁹ using a modified CASCADE/BICONF algorithm⁴¹, following largely⁴². An estimated QBER is also obtained during error correction and is used to determine the amount of secure key bits to be extracted from the raw key bits. Privacy amplification is then performed on both sides for obtaining the final secure keys⁴³.

We estimate a total system loss of -33 dB in our entire QKD system, with -7 dB contributed by the total channel loss of the deployed fiber, -6 dB from the optical coupling loss in the polarisation compensation and analyzer setup, and another -20 dB solely due to the detection efficiency of the InGaAs APDs on both sides. Therefore, detector efficiency is the dominant contribution to the overall system loss in our setup.

III. PERFORMANCE

With the 10 km deployed fiber connected and the source pump power kept at 2.4 mW, the rate of detected single photons is about 40000 s^{-1} on Alice's analyzer, and 242000 s^{-1} at Bob's side, respectively. We observe a coincidence rate of 670 s^{-1} and an accidental coincidence




FIG. 4. QBER (top) and finally key rate (bottom) logged over 5.7 hours of continuous operation. Error correction and privacy amplification are performed over blocks of raw key bits integrated over 25 seconds. Data collection stopped after 5.7 hours due to a detector failure.

rate of 19 s^{-1} . After an initial fiber compensation, the QKD setup operated continuously over 5.7 hours until one of the detectors ceased operation due to a temperature overrun. The average sifted key rate after basis reconciliation is 340 s^{-1} with an average estimated QBER of 6.3%. **About 1.4% of the error bits are contributed by the accidental coincidences and only 0.4% are due to state preparation from the entanglement source. The remaining 4.5% in QBER is caused by imperfections in polarization optics and fiber compensation, as well as possible depolarization in the fiber link**²⁸. The final key rate after error correction and privacy amplification is about 109 bits/second (Fig. 4).

Our final key rate is comparable to other reported entanglement-based implementations at telecom C-band²¹, or at wavelengths detectable by Silicon APDs⁴⁴. Secure transfer of messages with this key rate is practical using one-time pad encryption for low bandwidth communications such as command & control of industrial systems. Alternatively, the key can be utilized in fast encryption schemes using e.g. AES-256, with a much more frequent re-keying compared to conventional methods²⁰. The key rate in our demonstration is mainly limited by the low detection efficiency ($\sim 10\%$) and high dark count rate ($\sim 10^4 \text{ s}^{-1}$) of the InGaAs APDs in the setup. Significant increase in key rate is expected when replacing them with superconducting nanowire detectors ($\sim 80\%$ detection efficiency)⁴⁵. As practical advantage of photons at O-band, QKD can operate along the normal internet traffic with all channels in C-band concurrently over the same fiber link⁴⁶

IV. CONCLUSION

We have demonstrated a stable entanglement-based quantum key distribution system operating over a deployed telecom fiber of 10 km distance following the BBM92 protocol. Polarization-entangled photon pairs in the telecom

O-band minimize the effect of chromatic dispersion. The polarisation change in the fiber due to fiber geometry and birefringence is compensated with liquid crystal variable retarders, enabling stable transmission of photon polarisation states. We operated the systems continuously for 5.7 hours with an average QBER of 6.4% and a final key rate of 109 bits/s. The key rate performance is mainly limited by the detection efficiencies and high dark count rate of the InGaAs photodetectors.

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